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Abstract 
Present  Hungarian  elite  was  born  from  process  of  transformation  after  1990. 
Hungarian economy has become one of the most globalised economies of the world, and 
integrated  to  Europe.  In  business  elite  two  generations  are  distinguished.  The  older 
generation was already in manager or owner position before the system changed, but they 
did not come from Communist political nomenclature. The second generation finished their 
university studies in the late 1980s, without any initial capita, and their emergence showed 
greater  similarities  to  Western  contemporaries.  Others  are  present  managers  and 
technocrats of big companies (TNCs and national as well), bankers and also from SMEs. 
The main group is from the political and public administration bureaucracy, who is in 
important  positions  at  ministries,  local  authorities  or  at  European  institutions.  The 
Hungarian elite  is Europeanised,  but  divided,  because  some  part,  particularly national 
companies and SMEs are negatively affected by process of European integration. 
Keywords: Integration Maturity, Transformation, Europeanisation, Business and 
Economic Elite. 
 
MACARİSTAN’IN BÜTÜNLEŞME OLGUNLUĞU:  
MACARİSTAN EKONOMİK ELİTİNİN AVRUPALILAŞMASI  
 
Özet 
Şuanki  Macar eliti  1990  sonrasından  yaşanan  dönüşüm  sürecinden  doğmuştur. 
Macar  ekonomisi  Avrupa  ile  bütünleşmiş  ve  dünyanın  en  küresel  ekonomilerinden  biri 
olmuştur. İş eliti çerçevesinde iki nesil göze çarpmaktadır. Komünist siyasi nomenklatürden 
gelmeyen  eski  nesil,  sistem  değişmeden  önce  ya  kendi  işinin  sahibi  ya  da  yönetici 
konumundaydı. Üniversite çalışmalarını 1980’lerin sonlarına doğru bitiren ikinci nesil ise, 
başlangıç sermayesi olmayıp Batılı çağdaşlarıyla benzer özellikler taşımaktadır. Diğerleri 
ise  büyük  şirketlerin  (ulusaşırı  ve  ulusal  şirketler)  şuanki  müdürleri  ve  teknokratları, 
bankerler ve KOBİ yöneticileridir. Siyasi ve kamu yönetimi bürokrasisinden gelen büyük 
grup  ise  bakanlıklar,  yerel  yönetimler  veya  Avrupa  kurumlarında  önemli  mevkilerde 
bulunmaktadırlar. Macar eliti Avrupalılaşmıştır fakat ulusal şirketler ve KOBİ’ler başta 
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olmak  üzere  bazı  gruplar  Avrupa  bütünleşmesi  sürecinden  zarar  gördükleri  için  kendi 
içinde bölünmüştür.  
Anahtar  Kelimeler:  Bütünleşme  Olgunluğu,  Dönüşüm,  Avrupalılaşma,  İş  ve 
Ekonomi Eliti 
 
INTRODUCTION 
We  consider  integration  maturity  as  framework  of  our  analysis,  which 
reflects  the  capacity  of  a  country  to  exploit  benefits  of  integration.  Integration 
maturity  and  Europeanisation  are  closely  related.  Integration  maturity  is 
conditioned by the level of Europeanisation in different fields, and high level of 
Europeanisation  of  a  country  means  that  with  high  probability  it  can  exploit 
advantages of integration. First, we analyse the transformation of the Hungarian 
economy  and  society  after  1988,  which  was  accompanied  by  rapid  global  and 
European integration. We show the different ways of emergence of the Hungarian 
capitalist class, which forms one basic element of the Hungarian elite, besides the 
managers  of  TNCs,  or  the  high  level  state  bureaucracy.  We  show  that  the 
Hungarian elites are highly Europeanised, and beneficiary of European integration. 
Some are, however, at the loosing end (national companies and SMEs), and they 
represent those, who resent globalisation and European integration. A chapter is 
added about creation  of European studies  centres  in Hungary, and their role in 
creation of the European elite. 
 
TRANSFORMATION AND INTEGRATION OF HUNGARIAN ECONOMY 
We consider integration maturity as framework of our analysis. Integration 
maturity can be defined as a capability to exploit the benefits of the given form of 
integration to the  maximum,  while the costs and  drawbacks  can be  minimised. 
Integration maturity can be measured by comparing costs and benefits. A country 
is mature for integration if membership on the whole is advantageous for it. 
Integration  maturity  and  Europeanisation  are  closely  related.  Integration 
maturity is conditioned by the level of Europeanisation in different fields, and high 
level  of  Europeanisation  of  a  country  means  that  with  high  probability  it  can 
exploit advantages  of  integration. In  our paper, Europeanisation and  integration 
maturity are analysed in social and political dimensions. The economic elites play a 
crucial role in the process, their and the country’s success or failures are closely 
connected. 
After  1990,  the  Hungarian  economy  and  society  were  fundamentally 
transformed and the process was accompanied by substantial modernisation and 
global  adjustment.  The  market  reforms  restored  the  normal  functioning  of  the 
market and by the end of 1990s Hungary was recognised as “functioning market 
economy” by the EU Commission. As result of privatisation, similar proportions of 
private sector to developed countries was created, which produced over 80% of 
GDP. Hungary became a capitalistic country. The European Union’s Trade Strategy …             DEÜ SBE Dergisi, Cilt:12, Sayı:2 
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The structure of economy was radically transformed. The process started 
already  after  the  Second  World  War,  when  the  formerly  underdeveloped 
agricultural economy was changed to an industrial-agrarian economy, with rapid 
urbanisation.  After  1990,  the  process  took  new  dimensions.  Between  1989  and 
2001,  the  proportion  of  agriculture  in  GDP  shrank  from  15%  to  4%  that  of 
manufacturing from 34% to 28%, while the share of services increased from 42% 
to 67%.  The structure of Hungarian economy converged substantially to the most 
developed  countries, and in  fact entered into the post-industrial society. By the 
development  of  communication  infrastructure,  it  made  a  big  step  towards  the 
communication-information society. 
In the last 20 years, the Hungarian economy has become one of the most 
globalised  economies  of  the  world.  According  the  KOF  Globalization  Index  of 
2009, Hungary ranks 10th among the 189 countries of the world (11. Czech R., 13. 
Finland, 16. France, 17. Estonia, 22. Germany, 27. U.K. 32. Greece, 34. Latvia, 38. 
US.)
1  
Hungary with its 10 million populations is a small country, and structurally 
is  a  highly  open  economy.  The  foreign  trade  gives  about  70%  of  GDP,  which 
means  high  global  dependence  from  external  factors.  The  high  globalisation  is 
based  on  massive  inflow  of  foreign  direct  investment;  between  1989  and  2009 
more than €80bn was invested in the country. The share of foreign investments in 
1990 was only 1,7% of GDP, now it is over 50%. Foreign TNCs give about 70% of 
industrial  production,  nearly  90%  of  industrial  export,  and  more  than  50%  of 
employment. The outgoing investments from NMCs just started in recent years. In 
2008, the investment abroad of Hungary reached €12bn, and they are close to 15-
20% of incoming FDI, which proportion is highest in the region. But the average of 
developed countries is somewhat around 150%. The transnationalisation process is 
external and asymmetric. Hungary has few TNCs of its own (OTP, MOL, Matav), 
and they operate and expand only on regional markets of neighbour countries. The 
unevenness of the integration process is reflected also in a certain duality of local 
SME sector. Only their smaller part integrates into global economy (TNCs), while 
most of them remain outside, and still mainly oriented to local economy. 
The  transformation  was  accompanied  by  rapid  opening  (“negative 
integration”  –  Tinbergen)  of  the  economy.  The  foreign  trade  was  liberalised 
(elimination  of  bureaucratic  control  of  external  trade,  reduction  of  tariffs  and 
subsidies) during 1988-1993, and up to 2000 the country engaged into free trade 
with most of the European countries. It meant a free trade association with the EU 
(Europe Agreements), free trade arrangement with EFTA and other countries of the 
region  (CEFTA  –  Central  European  Free  Trade  Agreement).  By  1989  the 
Hungarian forint was convertible on current account, which was extended to capital 
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Economic  -  flows,  cooperation  intensity,  restrictions.  Social  -  Personal  contacts, 
information  flows,  cultural  proximity.  Political  -  Diplomatic  relations,  membership  in 
international organisations, UN. Security Council participation. 
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account  convertibility  by  1996,  and  from  2001,  the  HUF  have  become  fully 
convertible. By entering the EU in 2004 as a full member, Hungary has become a 
globally open economy not only in structural terms, but also in institutional and 
economic policy dimensions. 
The high globalisation means, in fact, a high Europeanisation of Hungarian 
economy.  Traditionally  more  than  80-85%  of  Hungarian  foreign  trade  was 
conducted with other European countries. Since 1989, the trade intensity (share in 
GDP) has highly increased, and at the same time, it was reoriented towards the 
European Union. In 1990, the share of EC in Hungarian foreign trade was only 
about  25-30%,  which  increased  already  by  1993  (prior  to  Europe  Agreements) 
above 50%, and it is now around 75%. 
The process of integration with Europe was basically promoted by foreign 
TNCs, based on their massive FDIs (dis-location) during the last 20 years. The EU 
membership boosted this process further, particularly up to 2008, but it remains 
open  how  this  continues  after  the  present  economic  crisis  is  over.  The  EU 
integration brought about 2-2.5% growth “surplus” for the country. Hungary’s per 
capita income in the 1960s were around 60% of the European average, and it 
was about 50% higher than that of Portugal and Greece. By early 1990, due to 
structural crisis of Soviet system, and then the “transformation recession” it 
fell back to around 43%. Per capita GDP of Hungary now is around 62% of 
that of EU27 (of course above data are not comparable with 1960s, but show 
the trend). Now, Portugal and Greece is still about 50% above the Hungarian 
level. Re-convergence had an encouraging start, but it was broken by the 2008-
2009 recession. While on the whole the integration brought substantial gains 
for the country, not all part of the economy was benefiting of it. As result of 
EU membership, large number of small and medium firms, inefficient small farms 
(hundred thousands of semi-subsistence farms), and the capital-intensive service 
sectors seems to be at the loosing end, as result of increased competition. 
 
PRIVATISATION AS MAJOR ELEMENT OF TRANSFORMATION 
The  end  of  1980s  was  marked  by  the  collapse  of  the  Soviet  system  in 
Central and Eastern Europe, provoked by deep political, economic and social crisis, 
demonstrating  the  failure  of  bureaucratic  central  planning,  and  the  popular 
rejection  of  one  party  system.  In  the  years  of  1989-90,  the  Communist  party 
dominated  political  structures  were  replaced  by  multi-party  parliamentary 
democracies,  and  the  countries  of  Central  and  Eastern  Europe  embarked  on 
fundamental transformation of their economies and societies.  
The economic transformation in itself has several aspects. 
1. Internal transformation of the socio-economic structures: marketisaton 
and privatisation 
2. External aspects of transformation - international (re-)integration The European Union’s Trade Strategy …             DEÜ SBE Dergisi, Cilt:12, Sayı:2 
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2.1  Opening  the  formerly  closed  national  (planned)  economies 
(“negative integration”) 
2.1.1.  Elimination  of  trade  monopoly  of  state,  and  liberalization  of 
foreign trade 
   2.1.2. Convertibility of national currencies 
   2.1.3. Liberalization of foreign investments  
   2.2. Integration (re-integration) into the world economy  
2.2.1. Joining international institutions (IMF, OECD, CEFTA, NATO)  
2.2.2. Associating (joining) the EU as a strategic integration partner 
(“positive integration”). 
From point of view of economic and social transformation the privatisation 
played a crucial role. Privatisation was the most important strategic development 
toward transformation of economies and societies of Central and Eastern European 
countries.  While  certain  sort  of  marketisation  was  accepted  by  the  reform 
countries,  the  privatisation  was  rejected  until  the  end  of  1980s  by  the  Party 
leaderships in all CEEcs. Socialism and communism were defined as public sector 
economies  and  any  privatisation  was  thought  as  a  break  with  basic  Marxist 
principles and therefore it was a political and ideological taboo all the time. The 
privatisation created new economic elite of the country.  
It must be noted, that the elements of private sector survived even the most 
severe Stalinist periods, and they usually revived in the times of relaxation of the 
political course. The process has become marked particularly from the beginning of 
1980s. The privatisation process, therefore, was not without antecedent, it can not 
be understood without this, particularly as far as Hungary is concerned. 
1. Private sector prevailed in retail, repair, services and handicrafts (except 
for the SU or Cuba). 
2. Private plots were allowed in agriculture for co-operative members, all 
the time, and in some fields they played important role in market supply (in 
Hungary, since the 1960s a peculiar symbiosis of the co-operative sector 
and the almost unconstrained small-scale household production) 
 3.  There  was  a  sizeable  second  economy  ("black  economy"  or 
"moonlighting") and it flourished particularly in the reform economies and 
periods of relaxation. 
 4.  Loose forms of co-operatives were developed, where there were broad 
possibilities of private  initiatives and  entrepreneurship, particularly from 
the 1980s (Hungary, Poland and the SU after 1987). 
 5.  Entrepreneurship  in  the  public  sectors  was  increasingly  recognized 
(profit motives, innovation, managerial skills and attitudes), which lead to 
the  development  of  performance  and  profit  motivated  managers  (in 
Hungary already after 1968).  Palankai, T.                                                           DEÜ SBE Dergisi, Cilt:12, Sayı:2 
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 6. Although, the capital markets did not exist, in Hungary from the early 
1980s  public  utility  bond  or  shares  were  issued  to  private  persons 
(telephone, water supply etc.).  
7. The number of joint ventures with Western firms gradually increased, 
particularly in the 1980s. 
In the simplest definition, on micro level, privatisation is the transfer or 
exchange of public assets to private persons, while in macro terms it is a process, 
which  leads to the  dominance  of the private sector or the creation  of a private 
market economy. In a broader approach, some define privatisation as destatization, 
reduction of the role of the state in general.  
In general, there are four major ways of creation of private market 
economy in CEE:  
1.  Establishment  of  new  private  companies.  One  major  way  of 
privatisation is through the private investments and establishment of 
firms  (Gründung)  and  their  increase  and  expansion.  This  is  a 
continuous,  organic,  evolutionary  process,  which  is  the  natural 
characteristic of a healthy market economy. This can be connected to 
the withdrawal of state companies from given fields and leaving the 
market  for  entering  private  investors.  The  private  capital  may  be 
simply invested into state companies, transforming them into private 
business.   
In fact, in most of those CEEcs, which have chosen market privatisation, 
great part of the private sector has been created by the establishment and expansion 
of an indigenous private sector brought into existence by investing and setting up 
new  "start-up"  firms  and  entities,  and  not  directly  by  privatisation.  The  same 
applies to foreign companies, which in particularly certain fields (manufacturing, 
shopping centres etc.) have overwhelmingly been (in 60-70%) results of "green 
field  investments",  rather  than  buying  or  acquiring  existing  firms.  Sometimes, 
however, it is difficult to distinguish, because the new firms are built indirectly on 
the "ruins" of some former entities.  
2.   Through  privatisation.  In  the  West,  market-privatisations  dominate: 
selling companies, state stocks, auctions and tenders, or management 
or  employee  buyouts.  In  the  case  of  the  privatisation  of  individual 
companies, initial public offering (IPO) is often applied. It can be made 
through an  open tender  or direct  invitation  of potential buyers. The 
main  agents  in  privatisation  may  be  private  or  legal  persons 
(companies).  
In CEEcs, several forms of privatisation (central direct selling of assets, 
open tenders etc.) have been applied. The important forms were the "manager" and 
"employee"  privatisations  (buy  outs).  Voucher  (or  coupon)  privatisation  was 
planned  or  started  in  many  countries  (Czech  and  Slovak  Republic,  Estonia, 
Lithuania,  Mongolia,  Rumania,  Russia,  Ukraine  etc.).  In  Hungary,  voucher The European Union’s Trade Strategy …             DEÜ SBE Dergisi, Cilt:12, Sayı:2 
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privatisation has been rejected, but the "compensation" or restitution bonds can be 
considered as vouchers. 
Privatisation through selling companies to foreign firms was also broadly 
applied. Privatisations by foreigners, however, concentrated mostly to certain fields 
(food  processing,  sugar,  alcohol,  tobacco  and  paper  industry,  and  also  to  some 
strategic sectors like energy or telecommunication). In ailing and declining sectors 
or companies in trouble, there was a general lack of interest, while some critics 
claimed  that  the  cream  of  the  state  sector  was  skimmed  by  just  the  foreign 
investors.  The  main  foreign  investors  were  the  transnational  companies  or  the 
former trade partners or others with close personal connections.  
3.  Through  re-privatisation.  In  the  West,  it  is  conceived,  as  re-
transferring of formerly nationalized sectors or companies into private 
hands, in general. In this case, the former owners were compensated 
for nationalization in most cases with fair price. In the East, in general, 
there was no compensation. Re-privatisation is, therefore, defined, as 
some  sort  of  direct  or  indirect  restoration  of  original  ownership  on 
nationalized  or  confiscated  properties.  In  Hungary,  direct  re-
privatisation  was  limited  only  to  church  property  (related  to  church 
functions)  and  restoration  of  some  land  ownership,  combined  with 
restitution bonds. In other countries, in some cases, the properties were 
given directly back to former owners. 
4.  Through  the  simple  shrinkage  or  collapse  of  the  state  sector 
(bankruptcies, liquidation, cutting production, closing down factories 
or stealing assets). In case, ailing or outdated sectors or capacities, this 
was one of the main forms of “privatisation”.  
 
GENESIS OF THE NEW ECONOMIC (BUSINESS) ELITE IN HUNGARY  
The development of post-Soviet capitalism shows several characteristics. 
“One of the main specificity of transition form state socialism to market capitalism 
is its inorganic character. Historically, it is the first time that before the transition to 
capitalism  there  was  no  (considerable)  capital  owner  class;  consequently,  the 
capitalism should be created without capitalists.” (Kolosi – Szelényi, 2010:10) 
In this respect, the countries of the regions differed substantially. In the 
reform countries (like Hungary or Poland), the private sector emerged and gained 
strength already in the 1970s and 1980s, and that made possible certain capital 
accumulation.  Due  to  marketisation  measures  after  1868,  the  autonomy  of 
managers in the state sector increased, they behaved (sometimes had to), like their 
capitalist  counterparts.  This  generation  was  already  in  managerial  or  owner 
position before the system changes, and they used their capital accumulated during 
the socialism for making their fortune later. The second generation of new rich had 
a different way of carrier, they finished their university studies in the late 1980s, Palankai, T.                                                           DEÜ SBE Dergisi, Cilt:12, Sayı:2 
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without any initial capital, and their emergence showed greater similarities to that 
of their Western contemporaries.  
In  both  generations  the  technocratic-managerial  backgrounds  played 
important  role.  Most  of  business  elite  have  university  diploma,  there  are  rare 
exceptions,  that  they  have  lower  education.  Of  course,  in  the  sphere  of  lower 
levels, particularly in the SMEs, there are many less educated, and we know the 
phenomenon of “lumpen-bourgeoisie”, in many cases related to illegal or criminal 
economy. 
Contrary  to  some  assumptions,  the  first  generation  did  not  come  from 
Communist political nomenclature; there are only few exceptions that somebody 
from the  former party  elite  got  into the  capitalist  owner club. That particularly 
applies  to  the  older  generation.  Those  close  to  pension,  proved  to  be  the  “lost 
generation”, and they could hardly preserve even their previous positions. There 
are, however, many from the then middle aged party bureaucrats, who ended up in 
certain private business, but mostly in peripheral activities (setting up of an ostrich 
farm),  and  they  definitely  do  not  belong  to  the  present  business  elite.  This 
contradicts to the theory of “political capitalism” as a main hypothesis of post-
socialist  transformation,  proposed  originally  by  Jadwiga  Staniszkis  and  Elemér 
Hankiss.  “It  is  a  fact,  that  there  were  attempts  to  convert  political  capital  to 
economic one, but these, almost in each case, failed, or even best case, they can be 
only  half-successes.”  (Kolosi  –  Szelényi,  2010:  25)  Hankiss-Staniszkis 
assumptions, however, apply to Russia, although, that due to Gorbatchow policies, 
many young people got into the Soviet political nomenclature in the 1980s, and 
they became the main beneficiaries of privatisation.  
One  of  the  main  gainers  of  the  market  transformation  was  the 
representatives  of  “late  Kadarian  technocracy”.  They  have  university  diploma, 
mostly as engineers or economist, but many of them were lawyers or even medical 
doctors. They had the necessary professional training, but also wide managerial 
experiences  and  international  connection,  both  in  business  spheres  or  public 
administration.  Their  cultural  and  network  capital  was  satisfactory  enough  for 
exploiting the opportunities offered by privatisation. 
Typical cases were the “bankers”, who made their carrier and fortune in the 
financial  spheres.  They  used  the  stock  options  and  they  became  the  main 
beneficiaries  of  bank  privatisation.  Later  many  made  their  fortune  in  financial 
sectors  as  brokers  or  traders  of  different  financial  services  and  assets.  The 
privatisation leasing was also a lucrative business. 
As the program mass privatisation started, the problem of lack of initial 
capital had to be addressed. There were two way for it. One was the so called E-
Credit (Existence Credit), which was given exclusively for privatisation and for 
Hungarian citizens. The interest rate was 3-4% (while the current interest rate was 
about  30%),  and  its  maturity  was  10-12  years.  In  case,  even  90%  of  the 
privatisation  project  could  be  financed  that  way.  The  other  was  the  so  called 
restitution bonds, which was based on re-privatisation, and it was a certain voucher The European Union’s Trade Strategy …             DEÜ SBE Dergisi, Cilt:12, Sayı:2 
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for  compensation  for  the  former  owner,  who  lost  their  property  during  the 
Communist  period  through  nationalisation  or  confiscation.  As  we  noted  above, 
beyond that, the notion of voucher privatisation was rejected by Hungary, and it 
was the only country, which insisted exclusively on market privatisation.  
The main forms of privatisation by the managerial and technocratic class 
were the so called management buy outs and setting up new business. The two was 
often combined. The managers bought their managed companies or they took part 
in the so called employee’s shared ownership programs. Later could mean joint 
ownership  with  the  employees,  but  in  many  cases,  it  ended  up  by  buying  out 
gradually  the  majority  of  the  shares  or  the  whole  company  by  someone.  The 
manager privatisation  was often called privatisation  by “deputies”. The top, the 
number one managers were even in the late Kadarian period’s political appointees, 
and the real management of the company or institution was left to the professional 
deputies. While the former ones were largely discredited, the “deputies” had all the 
capacities and at the same time the network capital to successfully compete in the 
privatisation process. 
Some  of  the  later  business  elite  started  in  former  private  business.  The 
small business in handicrafts, in repair, in restaurants or the private practice  of 
doctors (dentists) was tolerated even during the harshest Communist times. Some 
of them successfully developed their business after 1990, but there are only few 
exceptions, who become billionaires. The other possibility was to start from the 
second  economy,  which  was  partly  legal,  particularly  connected  with  the 
agricultural cooperatives, and partly could be called as a real “second economy” as 
far as it meant semi-legal or illegal activities, mostly in trade. For the later, the 
typical  example  was  the  import  of  computer  or  communication-information 
products  and  technologies,  which  were  under  COCOM  restrictions,  but  which 
were,  however,  informally  tolerated  as  they  served  “strategic  interests”  of  the 
country.  
The financial sources and support for privatisation process was, of course, 
not enough. It had to be combined with entrepreneurial and risk taking capacities. 
Information  and  imagination  were  also  important.  For  bank  credit,  collateral, 
knowledge and network capital was also needed. 
The  case  was  different  with  the  second  generation.  Among  them,  two 
separate way of carrier can be distinguished. A great part of them, relied on their 
political  positions,  but  their  political  capital  was  accumulated  already  after  the 
systemic changes. Some belonged to the late Kadarian political elite, they were 
functionaries of the Communist Youth Organisation, but they actively participated 
in democratic transformation, which gave them legitimacy in the emerging new 
democratic structures. Many others built up their carrier in the newly emerging 
democratic parties. The political capital was particularly important in the earlier 
periods of privatisation (1992-96); these were the years of getting rich rapidly. The 
corruption cases demonstrate that their importance remained until recently.  Palankai, T.                                                           DEÜ SBE Dergisi, Cilt:12, Sayı:2 
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The other part relied on its knowledge and business capacities. Many of the 
present  business  elite  started  as  inventors,  innovators  or  they  come  from  the 
scientific  research  fields.  The  typical  spheres  are  the  software  business,  the 
computers  trade  and  development,  new  medicines,  health  treatments, 
communication and the eco-business. Some started from scratch (from garage), and 
made a spectacular rise on the business ladder. Their carrier is the most similar to 
that  of  Western  counterparts,  who  made  their  success  overwhelmingly  on  their 
special  knowledge  and  talent.  For  them,  besides  the  good  entrepreneurial 
capacities,  the  good  political  network  capital  (gaining  public  tenders)  is  also 
equally important.  
A part of the new elite based its carrier and success on its income or capital 
brought  “home”  from  abroad.  These  were  old  (leaving  the  country  in  1956  or 
before) or later émigrés (leaving in the 1970s and 1980s), or those, for example 
from foreign trade, who managed to accumulate capital abroad before 1989. Their 
share, however, remained fairly modest, particularly contrary to Baltic countries, 
and there are only few, who got into the upper class of the richest capitalists. It is a 
Hungarian  specificity  that  the  Hungarian  business  elite  is  rooted  rather  in  the 
domestic economy.  
“In  Central-Europe  the  ownership  relations  are  consolidated,  the  new 
capitalist class can be considered to be established. The politics is rather dependent 
on it, than it depends on politics. Contrary to that the private property is far not 
consolidated  either  in  Russia,  or  in  China,  although  the  fluidity  of  ownership 
relations  has  opposite  character.  In  China,  one  can  be  a  billionaire  through 
managerial way, and then he must look for political protection. Contrary to that, in 
Russia, the big capitalists are appointed by politics, and then they can be deprived 
of  their  property  (or  even  from  their  freedom)  by  almost  completely  as  one 
pleases.” (Kolosi – Szelényi, 2010: 283) 
A great part of the Hungarian economic elite, in its strict sense, is not from 
the  capitalist  owner  class.  These  are  the  present  managers  and  technocrats, 
although, many of them have decent fortune and can be considered as rich, but 
their  high  incomes  are  based  on  their  professional  performance.  These  are  the 
managers  and  high  technocrats  of  big  companies  (TNCs  and  national  as  well), 
bankers and working in different fields of economic life. Many are working for 
consulting  firms,  in  research  fields  or  they  are  simply  free  lancers,  but  having 
regular assignments as high experts from both private or public sector. These are 
high  level  trained  experts  or  people  working  in  different  strategic  position  of 
business or political sphere. Some of them are crucial figures of economic elite as 
far as they sit in strategic positions of decision making. There are a great number of 
journalists,  who  play  particularly  important  role  in  forming  public  opinion  in 
economic and business matters. Some of these people make occasional “excursion” 
to political life, but their existence is not based on politics. A big group of these 
elite is from the political bureaucracy, who is in important positions at ministries, 
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the different EU institutions has to be particularly mentioned. These are close to 
business elite, in some sense, they definitely belong to it. 
 
IMPACT OF EUROPEANISATION AND THE ELITE 
The  globalisation  is  accompanied  with  growing  inequities.  The 
proportions,  due to  lack  of proper statistics, are broadly  disputed, but the  main 
trends of the last decades can be hardly denied. The increased inequities can be 
shown between different social classes or groups, between regions and countries as 
well. Regional disproportion has increased inside the countries (such as China or 
India), but also among the main global regions (Europe, America or South-East 
Asia). 
The  trends  of  increasing  social  gaps  in  relations  to  transformation  and 
globalisation  of  Central  and  Eastern  Europe  is  also  marked.  „Across  most  of 
Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union in the 1990s, a limited 
circle reaped major material gains from the new connection to global capitalism, 
while the majority of the people saw their standard of life worsen.” (Scholte, 2005: 
322)  The  problem  for  Hungary  is  dramatically  presented  by  Professor  Laszló 
Bogár. “The ‘local society’ of globality has emerged, elite, which represents the 
upper  5%,  but  owns  30-35%  of  the  resources.  On  the  other  pole,  there  is  the 
“negative print” of this, the junk or debris society of those, who fell out of history, 
and who represent about 20-35% and owning only 5-8% of resources. In between 
the two, their is an extremely heterogeneous middle society, which conducts a self-
exploiting struggle partly for climbing up to the local elite of globality, partly for 
escaping somehow from sliding down to the junk society.” Bogár, 2003: 340)    
The proportions may be disputed, but it is a fact that no more than 20-25% 
percent  of  the  society  is  on  the  gaining  side  of  transformation  (globalization  – 
Europeanisation), while about 10% of the society is in deep poverty, without any 
realistic hope to getting out of its situation. According to a TÁRKI research it can 
be  assumed  that  “in  these  two  decades,  about  20-25%  of  families  reached  the 
circumstances of a decent civilian welfare in a European sense, and although their 
majority lived better than the average even before the system change, their real 
living conditions today are comparably much better than before, even so if many of 
them not always feel this way.” (Kolosi – Szelényi, 2010: 279) 
The transformation was accompanied with the emergence of a capitalist 
owner class, which we can call the main representatives of business elite of the 
country.  According  the  statistics,  there  about  800.000  registered  companies, 
business units in the country. A great part of them are quasi companies, which are 
created  just  for  tax  optimalisation  and  bring  no  more  income  than  a  moderate 
salary. But it can be realistically assumed that 3-5% of the society, which could be 
considered as a real capitalist  owner class. Among them  only few  hundred are 
billionaires, and only about a dozen, who may own dollar billions. We can say 
therefore, that Hungary has a number of big capitalists, which can be considered 
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In recent years, in the Hungarian society, we can experience growing anti-
globalist and anti-European feelings. A great part of the society feels loser of the 
transformation  and  European  integration,  so  the  “transformation  fatigue”  or 
“Europe-fatigue” become a general phenomenon. The growing inequities support 
this  view, and  not only the poor think this way, but even the  great part of the 
middle class has mixed feeling, particularly because it look its future uncertain. 
That  was  particularly  strengthened  by  the  recent  global  crisis.  That  helped  the 
populist politicians and the lead to growing nationalistic feeling. (“We suffer now 
not  from  foreign  (Soviet)  tanks,  but  from  foreign  (Western)  banks.”  “Now  the 
commands are coming from Brussels, instead of Moscow.”) 
This  leads  us  to  the  question  of  Europeanisation  and  the  Hungarian 
economic  elite.  The  Hungarian  economic  elite  is  highly  Europeanised.  It  is 
basically due to high Europeanisation of Hungarian economy. The birth of this elite 
was  greatly  influenced  and  determined  by  the  fact  that  privatisation  and  the 
opening and integration of the country to Europe was parallel and closely related. 
We  don’t  speak  about  those  who  were  connected  to  TNCs  and  foreign  direct 
investments,  because  there  this  connection  is  entirely  obvious.  During  the 
privatisation process there was an intensive interconnection between the foreign 
and domestic actors. The foreigner often looked at local agents, and the later were 
taken  as  partners.  Sometimes,  the  money  was  brought  from  abroad,  but  the 
knowledge  or  necessary  relations  were  given  by  local  peoples.  The  external 
markets for the new enterprises were almost entirely in Europe, so the European 
orientation  from  the  beginning  was  vital.  There  are  many  examples  of  close 
business cooperation, and again the partners are almost entirely from Europe. Most 
part of the foreign  investments came from Europe,  and the target countries for 
emerging  Hungarian  capital  export  are  the  European  neighbour  countries.  The 
about 2/3 of the Hungarian commercial banking capital is owned by foreigners, 
mostly  from  Europe,  the  financial  and  banking  activities  orient  to  European 
(global) markets. After the joining, great part of elite public administration got into 
daily contacts with European Union institutions; they had to learn how to deal with 
Europe. 
The economic elite and particularly the broader business community are 
not exempted from the negative impacts and the process of disappointment. Even a 
part  of  the  big  business  is  calling  for  more  “national  protection”,  and  this  is 
characteristic mainly for those national big companies (emerging Hungarian TNCs, 
like OTP or MOL), which got into conflict with their foreign competitors.  Even 
those Hungarian SMEs, which were successful to get into the networks of TNCs as 
suppliers  or  sub-contractors,  often  feel  exploited,  and  forced  into  unfavourable 
conditions. This is  much  more the case  with  other  SMEs, which  much directly 
suffer from foreign competition, and even those who are not forced out of business, 
they feel an uncertain future. The large shopping centres and chains mean deadly 
competition for small local shops, and the death rate among them was particularly 
high in the recent years. The foreign competition was increasingly felt after the full 
membership in the EU from 2004, and the impacts could be clearly identified in 
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can be called a negative identification with Europe, namely this is also a certain 
sort of Europeanisation, but with negative consequences for the effected. 
 
INTRODUCTION  AND  DEVELOPMENT  OF  EUROPEAN  STUDIES  IN 
HUNGARY – TRAINING THE ELITE 
It  was  recognized  from  the  beginning,  that  enlargement  presupposes  a 
comprehensive  process  of  preparation  and  adaptation  of  the  country.  In  1991 
Hungary became an associate of the European Union, and thereby by 2000 became 
part  of  the  European  free  trade  area.  With  full  membership  it  joined  the  EU’s 
internal market and the common policies, and took part as full member in the work 
of EU institutions. It was clear, that this presupposes a fundamental transformation 
of Hungary’s entire economic structure and institutional system and widespread 
adaptation  at  every  level  (from  companies  to  the  state  administration).  This 
required the training of a large number of integration experts. 
The aim of education in European integration was to train experts whose 
basic  professional  knowledge  has  been  deepened  with  regard  to  European 
integration and who are sufficiently well qualified to take part, at both micro- and 
macro- level in every area of economic and social life, in carrying out the tasks 
relating to integration. We attached particular importance to the training of experts 
capable  of  properly  representing  Hungary’s  interests  in  the  EU  and  the  other 
international institutions (the OECD, NATO, etc.). 
In Hungarian higher education institutions, teaching and research relating 
to European integration began as long ago as the 1970s, and took off especially in 
the  1980s,  so  that  in  certain  universities  today  (Budapest,  Gödöllő,  Pécs) 
substantial traditions have developed. Teaching and research in this field have been 
associated with a number of professors and researchers, who even before the 1988-
89 changes had gained international reputation and recognition. The same can be 
said of a number of experts in institutes and the state apparatus, who were likewise 
considered outstanding international experts on the subject of European integration. 
So already by 1990, Hungary had already an expert elite on European integration, 
but far not enough in number in light of integration ambitions of the country.  
In  the  1990s  teaching  and  research  in  Hungary  relating  to  European 
integration  became  more  intensive.  A  suitable  standard  was  ensured  where 
properly  qualified  experts  and  a  research  base  existed,  and  where  there  were 
already long-established traditions of this kind of teaching. Elsewhere, however, 
the process has just began and it was clear, that it requires a few more years before 
teaching and research capacity of sufficient quantity and quality develops. 
In the period after 1990 teaching on the subject of European integration the 
Hungarian  higher  education  institutions  received  substantial  external  assistance 
within the framework of the Tempus, Erasmus, Jean Monnet, PHARE, and other 
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students, infrastructure development, support for research, financing  of courses, 
etc.). This contributed greatly to the development of European integration studies. 
The first ever European Documentation and Research Centre were set up in 
Hungary  in  1988  at  Eötvös  Lóránd  University,  and  this  was  followed  by  the 
establishment of similar centres at other universities, the CUB in Budapest and the 
main  universities  in  the  provinces.  These  centres  regularly  received  certain  EU 
publications  and  infrastructure  support  on  a  case-by-case  basis,  and  organized 
conferences, etc.  
From 1993 the EU Commission extended the Jean Monnet program first to 
Hungary  and  Poland  in  the  region.  From  1997  the  Czech  Republic  was  also 
included, and later the other candidate countries as well. The financial resources for 
the Jean Monnet program were provided out of Hungarian PHARE funds, on the 
basis of an agreement between the Commission and the Hungarian government. 
The  program  was  supplemented  by  others  measures  on  a  case-by-case  basis. 
Among these we can mention participation in ACE, in Framework Programs, and 
many individual researches and grants.  
From  the  academic  year  1998-99  the  so-called  EKKŐ  (European 
Scholarship  for  Training  in  Public  Administration)  program  was  launched,  in 
which roughly 133 students received grants of 100,000 forints per semester for two 
years.  The  students  had  to  enrol  for  special  courses  and  under  the  terms  of  a 
contract, to work in the state administration for two years after graduation. 
In  Hungary  the  teaching  of  European  Union  studies  at  university  level 
really received comprehensive, organized government support after 1998, with the 
establishment of 12 European Studies Centres financed by the PHARE program. 
We  can  safely  say  that  in  Hungary  by  1998  the  conditions  and  academic 
background had been created for the establishment of European Studies Centres de 
facto at all of the Hungarian universities.  
The ESCs, in fact, began their subsidised activities in the academic year 
1998-99. The non-repayable grant of ECU (euro)3m awarded to 12 ESCs in 14 
higher education institutions was for 3 years, ending in 2001. The grants provided 
resources  for  teaching  and  research  activities  and  for  the  infrastructure 
development  necessary  for  their  operation.  The  teaching  activity  of  the  centres 
ranged  from  basic  training  to  postgraduate  education,  and  the  organization  of 
profession- and target-oriented courses, chiefly for secondary school teachers, civil 
servants, media experts, businessmen and jurists. The centres drew external experts 
into  the  research  work;  the  results  were  reported  in  many  publications,  and 
conferences and seminars were organized. With the creation of the documentation 
centres important European information services could be provided, not only in 
higher education institutions. Teaching related to EU integration, of course, went 
on in various forms in other higher education institutions as well. It was a condition 
of the grant that the universities should continue the programs for 5 years after the 
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In  Hungary’s  higher  education  institutions  teaching  related  to  European 
integration  issues  were  being  carried  out  in  the  following  main  forms  and 
frameworks: 
EU  studies  are  being  incorporated  more  and  more  into  many  subjects, 
chiefly  in  accordance  with  the  particular  characteristics  and  professional 
requirements of each given specialized field (economics, law, political sciences, 
culture, engineering, medical studies etc.). The students thereby gain familiarity 
with the European integration aspects of the field in question, and acquire the most 
important knowledge that they may later need in the practice of their profession. 
The depth and nature of this varied according to the special field. Obviously the 
needs of a jurist are different from those of a vet. The incorporation of European 
integration studies into higher education courses had accelerated with the approach 
of full membership. 
Many  independent  courses  relating  to  European  integration  have  been 
launched. On the basis of figures by the academic year 2000-2001, in the ESCs 
altogether  340  subjects  were  taught.  These  basic  courses  dealt  mainly  with 
economic,  legal,  political,  historical,  sociological,  cultural,  linguistic  and  other 
aspects in the framework of covering one semester or more. In the 12 ESCs these 
subjects supplemented the professional training programs of the higher education 
institutions concerned. We can say that in Hungarian higher education, students at 
virtually  every  university  and  college  could  choose  from  a  large  number  of 
independent  courses  on  European  integration,  and  in  the  majority  of  subjects 
relating to their specialization they have access to the necessary knowledge in the 
form of independent courses. 
From the point of view of the PHARE program, support for training in 
specialized language was important, to enable students to master the terminology 
relating  to  integration  in  the  main  official  EU  languages,  and  the  language  of 
professional communication in connection with the given branches of knowledge. 
This is achieved partly through high-level mastery of specialized language within 
the framework of language teaching, and partly by teaching certain subjects in the 
foreign language.  
The development of specializations in European integration as part of basic 
higher education courses is the next level. In addition to the teaching of integration 
subjects in basic courses, this means courses where and students received some 
form of certification in it. The program of these specializations and special fields 
follows the structure of similar European courses, and in some cases they lead to 
the  equivalent  of  a  Master’s  degree  of  European  Integration.  The  first  5-year 
university training program in European studies began in the academic year 2000-
2001 in Szombathely. Since the start of Bologna process many other universities 
started European studies program both on Bachelor and on Master level. 
Postgraduate training in European integration for experts who already have 
a  university  degree  were  also  launched  at  virtually  every  studies  centre.  This 
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(specialized economist, specialized engineer, specialized jurist, etc.) may include 
European integration courses, which appear on the diploma and give a “Europe 
specialist” qualification in the given restricted field (agricultural or tax expert). To 
those  who  have  a  university  degree  but  not  necessarily  the  given  basic 
qualification, the universities offer so-called “Europe expert” diplomas. 
Doctoral training programs have begun, mostly as specialisation.  Up till 
now doctoral schools in European studies have not been accredited in Hungary 
simply because the law on higher education does not regard “European studies” as 
an independent field of knowledge. A handful of students at most institutions are 
working on Ph.D. topics relating to European integration, but these topics are all 
linked to already accredited doctoral programs. 
Doctoral programs are aimed mainly at the training of university teachers 
and researchers, but obviously people with such a depth of expertise can find good 
jobs in the practical sphere as well and also enjoy the prestige of the academic 
degree. It is no accident that there is great interest in doctoral programs on the part 
of people working in the state administration.  
With  the  establishment  of  the  centres  a  new  situation  has  evolved  in 
Hungary with regard to teaching and research in the field of European studies.  
1.  First  of  all  we  must  mention  the  growing  intellectual  and  physical 
capacity, the importance of which cannot be overestimated. The basis 
for  this  was  provided  by  the  few  dozen  qualified  teachers  and 
researchers who had already been  engaged in teaching and research 
activity in the area of European studies, had gained academic degrees 
in this field and were well known through their international contacts. 
They have been joined by those who in the past years have launched 
new  courses,  added  European  studies  to  their  earlier  courses  and 
become proficient in these and the related topics. It is difficult to give 
precise figures, since many people work together on a particular course 
or research topic, and a sizeable number of Ph.D. students have also 
been involved, but I think it is no exaggeration to say that in Hungarian 
higher education the number of people seriously engaged in European 
studies is about 250-300. This is a remarkable amount of intellectual 
capacity. 
2.  With  the  establishment  of  the  centres,  the  physical,  infrastructure 
capacity supporting these activities has also developed. In the case of 
several  centres  the  bases  for  these  were  the  former  Documentation 
Centres,  where  important  stocks  of  literature  and  documents  and 
computer  and  informatics  bases  were  created.  These  were  further 
developed  by  the  PHARE  program,  and  with  a  few  exceptions  the 
centres were provided with premises in the universities, together with 
the necessary infrastructure.  
3.   It is important that education relating to European integration and the 
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studies”, which is internationally recognized. We know that it consists 
of a marriage of law, economics, political science, sociology, history 
and  the  cultural  sciences  (European  culture).  Various  branches  of 
language studies can also be related to it. It is notable that this multi-
disciplinarity is characteristic of most of the universities and centres, 
with differences that of course traditional earlier strengths in certain 
fields and the academic profile of the faculties responsible determine 
the main emphases. But law, economics and politics are given greater 
or less emphasis everywhere.  
4.  The  comprehensive  nature  of  the  network  of  centres  means  that  in 
practice  ESCs  operate  in  the  great  majority  of  Hungary’s  higher 
education institutions, or are linked to them in some way. This means, 
and this cannot be sufficiently emphasized, that in Hungary today, as a 
result  of  the  program  of  support,  students  in  higher  education  have 
access to European integration studies, and in fact can take courses in 
these  in  their  own  institutions.  Total  area  and  regional  cover  is 
provided,  since  European  Studies  Centres  are  in  operation  in  all 
Hungary’s provincial university towns. 
 
CONCLUSION 
In the last 20 years, the Hungarian economy has become one of the most 
globalised economies of the world. The high globalisation means, in fact, a high 
Europanisation  of  Hungarian  economy.  In  Hungary  after  20  years  of 
transformation  the  capitalistic  ownership  relations  are  consolidated,  the  new 
capitalist class can be considered to be established. The other part are the present 
managers and technocrats of TNCs and national as well, bankers and working in 
different fields of economic life. Some of them are crucial figures of economic elite 
as far as they sit in strategic positions of decision making. There is a great number 
of journalists, who play particularly important role in forming public opinion in 
economic and business matters. The trends of increasing social gaps in relations to 
transformation and globalisation of Central and Eastern Europe is also affecting the 
elite. The Hungarian elite is Europeanised, but divided. While they are fighting and 
competing,  at  the  same  time,  they  are  compromising  and  cooperating. 
Development European Studies Centres in Hungary helped the birth and training 
the elite. 
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